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Abstract
The coffee market is distinguished for being volatile and uncertain in terms of domestic and international prices. Arabica and Robusta 
coffee are produced in 23 provinces of Ecuador. A decade-long decline of coffee production prompted the Ecuadorian government to 
launch a public program for replanting coffee trees towards the end of 2011. A grower’s decision to enter, remain in or exit the coffee 
sector is based on fluctuating profits from each year’s harvest sale. We analyzed the hypothesis whereby the coffee grower’s decision to 
leave the sector is explained by volatile and uncertain prices. This paper aimed to evaluate the coffee sector with an application of Real 
Option Analysis for the period 2002-2012. We also defined entry (H) and exit (L) prices for Arabica and Robusta coffee for the analyzed 
period. Our findings revealed high H and L prices encourage growers to leave the sector for the most part of the analyzed period. High 
H and L prices resulted from high variable cost due to increasing wages for farm workers. The Ecuadorian government is developing a 
policy to help growers make production more efficient, encouraging them to remain in the sector in the long run.
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Introduction 
The coffee sector has been one of the most 
important export sectors in Ecuador. Exports reached 
413 million USD (125,070 t) in 1994 but dropped to 
261 million USD (51,526 t) in 20121. The country 
produces Arabica and Robusta coffee for domestic 
and foreign markets. Ecuador’s share in the world 
coffee market dropped from 1.18% (1961) to 0.09% 
(2013) according to calculations using FAO data 
(FAO, 2015). Planted area and production show a 
declining trend. The cause of this decrease has not 
been analyzed in detail. The growing age of bearing 
trees, outbreaks of pests and diseases, lack of 
modernization and poor development of new coffee 
varieties are signs and reasons forthe decline of the 
sector in Ecuador.
Volatile coffee prices create an uncertain environment 
for growers’ in Ecuador and elsewhere. This uncertainty 
translates into unstable harvest prices and farm profits. 
Low-price periods affect growers’ household income 
in coffee-producing countries, and encourage them to 
abandon the crop (ICO, 2002). Even with volatile and 
uncertain prices, the growers’ motivation and decision 
to remain in the coffee sector are explained through 
cultural values, inherited coffee (Coffea sp) plantations, 
tradition and government incentives (Bacon, 2005; 
1
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Tucker et al., 2010; Borkhataria et al., 2012; Bravo et 
al., 2016). 
To mitigate low prices, alternative strategies such as 
converting conventional plantations into organic and 
shading coffee plantations have been evaluated in the 
literature. Positive benefits include increasing home 
income (Delgado & Pérez, 2013) and conservation of 
natural resources (Borkhataria et al., 2012). However, 
the economic benefit only improved household 
incomes very slightly due to the increasing cost of 
labor (Ruben & Fort, 2012). It was attractive only 
when mainstream market prices were low (Valkila, 
2009). Thus, organic and shading coffee systems are 
not necessarily the best solution in the long run, as 
coffee prices are formed in the international market, 
and these prices are volatile. 
The Ecuadorian Government was concerned by 
low coffee production in the last years, and launched a 
public program to replant coffee trees towards the end 
of 2011. The program includes technical assistance 
to improve crop management and credit for growers 
who established new plantations. Ultimately, it is 
the farmer’s choice to use this support and invest in 
renewed plantations and entering a sector characterized 
by uncertain profitability.
The volatile and uncertain environment, previously 
described, offers an angle for analysis on the coffee 
sector in Ecuador before the implementation of the 
public program. In this paper, we address the following 
questions: Have coffee growers been inclined to exit 
the sector due to volatile and uncertain prices for the 
2002-2012 period? Which coffee prices triggered the 
exit decision in the Ecuadorian market? To answer these 
questions, we used the Real Option Analysis, developed 
by Dixit (1989). This approach incorporates uncertainty 
and irreversibility in the investment decision. Coffee 
production is an activity characterized by a large 
investment in the plantation and production lasting over 
20 years. Therefore, it is important to consider volatility 
and uncertainty in the evaluation of the decision to 
invest in coffee. Also, we can estimate entry and exit 
coffee prices in Ecuadorian market for the period 2002-
2012. With these results, we aim to understand the 
Ecuadorian coffee growers’ decision in the market for 
the analyzed period.
The contribution of this work to the literature is 
two-fold. First, the validation of the hypothesis that 
volatile and uncertain coffee prices in the Ecuadorian 
market might explain the growers’ decisions to exit the 
sector.  If we fail to reject it, the conclusion would be 
that volatile coffee prices might have pushed growers to 
leave the sector during of the analyzed period. Second, 
we estimate entry and exit coffee prices for the period 
2002-2012 for Arabica and Robusta. 
Material and methods 
Coffee in Ecuador
Coffee is produced in 23 Ecuadorian provinces. 
Geography and climate are apt for the production of 
Arabica and Robusta coffee (Arabica in highlands and 
Robusta in lowlands). Manabí is the main producing 
province with 43.86% of the total bearing area (49,578 
planted hectares in 2012 (INEC, 2012)). According to the 
data from the (COFENAC) National Council of Coffee, 
Arabica coffee is mainly produced in the provinces of 
Manabí, Loja and El Oro. They represented 80.01% of 
the total production in 2012. The provinces of Orellana, 
Sucumbíos, Los Ríos and Esmeraldas produced 80.02% 
of the national production of Robusta in 2012. 
Fig. S1 [suppl.] shows Ecuadorian coffee production 
and average yield per hectare. Ecuador reached its highest 
coffee production in 1996 with 190,696 t; since that year, 
it dropped to 35,000 t in 2012. The highest average coffee 
yield was 0.56 t/ha in 2001. Comparing coffee average 
yields for 2012 between Ecuador (0.23 t/ha) and the main 
coffee-producing countries, such as Vietnam (2.25 t/ha), 
Brazil (1.43 t/ha), Colombia (0.60 t/ha) and Indonesia 
(0.53 t/ha) (FAO, 2015), reveals that Ecuador has a low 
average yield, which has been decreasing since 2001. 
Low prices affected the coffee growers’ incentives to 
maintain or increase the production in following years. 
Limited use of technology, aging of coffee trees, poor 
crop management (especially in pruning and insect 
control activities) and climate anomalies (delayed rainy 
season) explain the reduction of production and yields 
(COFENAC, 2013). INEC statistics for 2012 reported 
a lack of use of improved seeds (only the 8.71% of all 
coffee growers use improved seeds). Pests and diseases 
are the main causes of lost coffee hectares (15,829 has.) 
as well as low use of fertilizers (13.33%) and pesticides 
(15.45%) (INEC, 2012).
Fig. S2 [suppl.] shows the Ecuadorian coffee value in 
current USD and exported amounts in t, which reached 
their maximum in 1994 (USD 413.8 million and 125,070 
t). Ecuadorian coffee exports plummeted in 1994-2002, 
as a result of a reduction on domestic supplies and 
low price trends in the world market. The main export 
problem of the manufacture industry is the lack of 
coffee production in the country. This causes Ecuadorian 
companies to import coffee beans from Vietnam, Brazil 
and other countries (COFENAC, 2013). Since 2006, 
Ecuadorian coffee exports have been revived, reaching 
USD 261.05 million in 2012 (BCE, 2016). This is caused 
by the global trend of high coffee prices and increasing 
export of processed coffee (COFENAC, 2013). 
Coffee prices have been volatile due to variations in 
world supply (new plantations, frost and coffee bean 
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diseases), established export quotas in the International 
Coffee Agreement and de-regulation of the market (ICO, 
2002, 2014). Fig. S3 [suppl.] shows World Coffee Prices 
(Other Milds2 and Robusta) and Ecuadorian prices paid 
to growers. Ecuadorian prices have similarities with 
international coffee prices: high prices of 2.27 USD/
lb for Arabica (2011) and 1.43 USD/lb for Robusta 
(1995), and lowest prices of 0.27 USD/lb for Arabica 
(2001-2002) and 0.11 USD/lb for Robusta (2001-2002). 
The so-called Coffee crisis in 2001-2002) was caused 
by both the Vietnamese expansion and new Brazilian 
plantations (ICO, 2002). This forced a low price 
tendency in the market that affected growers’ income in 
coffee-producing countries. From 2004 to 2011, coffee 
prices saw an upward trend, caused by reduced harvests 
of the main coffee-producing countries (ICO, 2009). In 
that period of increase, Ecuadorian coffee production 
did not recover the values from the early 90s.
Real Options
Real Options theory is used to evaluate the 
implementation of projects as an alternative to the 
traditional method (Net Present Value) which does not 
consider volatility and uncertainty in the market. In 
addition, Real Options analysis is used to understand 
growers´ decisions concerning agricultural systems 
and products. Tozer (2009) evaluates the investment in 
Australian farms between precision agriculture and the 
conventional system. Delgado & Pérez (2013) analyze 
the change in coffee systems (conventional to organic) 
for Mexican growers worried about the fluctuation of 
coffee prices and the low incomes received each year. 
Andoseh et al. (2014) examine the implementation of 
public investment funds in a Biotechnology Research 
and Conventional Breeding project in Uganda. Wolbert 
& Musshoff (2014) study growers’ decision to maintain 
a conventional system instead of converting to a Short 
Rotation Coppice (SRC) system.
Entry and exit price for agriculture products
Entry and exit (price or revenues) resulting from the 
Real Options Analysis helps understand growers’ entry 
and exit decisions. Price & Wetzstein (1999) investigated 
peach production with price and yield uncertainty for 
the Georgian market in the USA. Isik et al. (2003) 
analyzed the decision of agribusiness firms investing 
in Remote Sensing Technologies (RST) in farms with 
uncertain demand. Tauer (2006) defined entry and exit 
daily prices for five farm sizes in the milk market in the 
USA. Luong & Tauer (2006) studied Vietnamese coffee 
growers from 1990 to 2002 and classified high, average 
and lower costs. The entry (0.47 USD/lb) and exit 
(0.17 USD/lb) prices supported the conclusion that a 
large number of Vietnamese farmers were efficient and 
survived the global crisis during the period investigated. 
Schmit et al. (2009) studied investment decisions in 
ethanol factories considering volatility in gross margins 
for the period 1998-2007 in USA. 
Coffee prices volatility
Several studies analyze the effect of volatile and 
uncertain coffee prices on growers. Eakin et al. (2006) 
estimated through household surveys the effect of 
coffee prices in Mexican, Guatemalan and Honduran 
communities. Mohan (2007) estimated the profits and 
costs of a risk-management mechanisms based on the 
purchase of “put” type options to mitigate the fluctuation 
in coffee prices and to guarantee a minimum price for 
growers. With ARCH and GARCH models, Worako et 
al. (2011) found that Ethiopian coffee prices are more 
volatile than Brazilian coffee prices. Malan (2013) studied 
cocoa and coffee price volatility in Côte d’Ivoire with a 
partial stabilization model to reduce volatility risk with 
the intervention of storage agencies that stock coffee in 
low price periods. Rueda & Lambin (2013) analyzed the 
effect of volatility in Colombian coffee growers’ decision 
with a global chain value (converting from conventional 
to ecological and sustainable coffee systems). Lukanima 
& Swaray (2014) used a GARCH model to evaluate the 
volatility of coffee prices in five different East African 
Countries after domestic market reforms (loosening 
government control and market liberalization). Mohan et 
al. (2014) used a GARCH model to evaluate volatility 
in coffee prices in India since the market liberalization, 
and estimated welfare gains if the Indian coffee growers’ 
exposure to volatility was reduced. In conclusion, it is 
very important to consider volatility in the evaluation of 
coffee investment decisions.
Methodology
The model used for coffee Real Options valuation in 
Ecuador was developed by Dixit (1989). The model is 
based on two assumptions: first, it assumes reinvestment, 
so that the project will have an infinite life; the second 
assumption is that land does not depreciate. If a firm 
wants to enter an economic activity, it will require a 
certain amount of funds to invest (K), the resources 
required for maintenance and operation cost (C) and 
resources to leave the activity (L) at any time.
2
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The application of the model is based on three steps 
described by Luong & Tauer (2006):
1) Definition of an idle project’s value. An idle 
project is the project awaiting initiation, whose value 
is equal to the option to invest. An idle project requires 
an amount of money to reinitiate the economic 
activity.  
2) Definition of an active project’s value. An active 
project’s value is the present value of the net revenues 
(if the firm operates in the market) added to the value of 
the abandonment option.
3) Definition of the entry and exit prices of option 
model. These prices are the same for idle and active 
projects. This results in two conditions: first, the value 
of an idle project is equal to that of an active project. 
Second, the rate change of an idle project’s value is 
equal to the rate change of an active project. With these 
conditions, the model will be resolved to determine the 
entry and exit prices for the coffee activity.
Table 1 shows the notation of model. 
The world market defines the coffee price 
exogenously. Therefore, it is assumed that it follows 
a random walk behavior and a geometric Brownian 
process.
,
where ε is a random value that follows a standardized 
normal distribution, and dP has a normal distribution, 
which means dP = μP dt and variance dP = σ2P2 dt.
The investment value V (P,t) is a function of variables 
price (P) and time (t). By a second-order Taylor Series, 
dV can be approximated as:
 
(1)
Terms dP and dt in the limit would tend to zero. Thus, 
the terms  dP and  are equal to 0, and 
replacing the term (dP)2 = σ2p2 dt in Eq. (1), it can be 
rewritten as:           
                        (2) 
 Replacing  in Eq. (2), we have Ito’s 
lemma:
               
   (3) 
The term dt is equal to zero in Eq. (3) (the time (t) 
is not an important variable decision due the infinite life 
of a project), and so, it can be expressed as:    
   
(4)
where the terms  and .
Next, we can take the expected value of both sides of 
Eq. (4), we obtain:
 
                    (5)
Definition of an idle project’s value 
In equilibrium, an expected capital gain of an idle 
project would be equal to the return of the investment 
(ρV0 (P) dt). With V0 (p) being the idle project to be 
initiated, therefore, we obtain:
       
(6) 
Dividing by dt, we have: 
               (7)
The solution of the differential equation is the 
following: V0 (P) = AP-α + BPβ, A and B constants are 
estimated in a later section, and where the α and β are 
equal as:
   
and
          
    
Table 1. Variables of the model
Variable Item Unit
V0 Value of idle project USD/lb
V1 Value of active project USD/lb
P Coffee market price (paid to grower) USD/lb
µ Expected rate of market growth %
σ2 Variance rate of price market %
C Variable cost per unit USD/lb
K Investment cost per unit USD/lb
X Abandonment cost per unit USD/lb
ρ Capital cost (discount rate), with ρ > µ %
H Market price to enter the activity USD/lb
L Market price to exit the activity USD/lb
(8)
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 The value of an idle project V0 (P) is defined as AP-α 
+ BPβ. If the market price is close to zero, it means that 
there are no incentives to initiate the project (the option is 
worthless), and so V0 (P) = 0, to have this fact, the constant 
A must be equal zero3 due the value of α>0 and β>1. Thus, 
the value of an idle project can be expressed as:
                                  V0 (P) = BPβ                                       (9) 
Definition of the value of an active project 
In equilibrium, for an active project, the normal 
return is equal to the addition of expected capital gain 
and net revenue flow:
                 ρV1 (P) dt = E[dV1]+(P - C)dt              (10)
Replacing the term  of 
Eq. (5) in Eq. (9), and dividing the equation for the term 
dt, we obtain:
 
(11)
Reordering all the terms of equation above and equal 
to 0, we obtain: 
  
(12)
The solution of Eq. (12) is equal to: 
. The solution shows the net revenue 
 flow  expressed  as    and abandonment option 
expressed as (AP-α + BPβ). If the market price tends to 
infinity (P → ∞), the option abandonment would tend 
to be zero. Considering the value of α>0 and β>1, the 
abandonment option would be zero (AP-α + BPβ = 0), only 
if B constant takes a value of zero4. Thus, the value of an 
active project can be expressed as:
                                     
(13)
Definition of the entry (H) and exit (L) prices 
H is the entry price that defines the firm’s entry 
decision. The value of the option of invest V0(H)  must 
be equal to the expected value of the executed project 
(V1(H)) minus the investment cost (K), and so, the 
value-match condition is:
                        V0(H)= V1(H)-K                           (14)
Also, the smooth-pasting condition requires that the 
two value functions meet tangentially:
                        V0 ´(H)= V1´(H)                            (15)
The firm’s exit decision is defined by the price L, so the 
abandonment option V0(L) must be equal to the expected 
value of the project (V1(L)) added to the abandonment 
cost X. Therefore, the value-match condition is:
                               V0(L) = V1(L) + X                         (16)
And the smooth-pasting condition requires that the 
two values functions meet tangentially:
                              V0´(L) = V1´(L)                       (17)
We obtain four equations that solve the entry (H) 
and exit (L) prices. Substituting V0(H), V1(H), V0(L) 
and V1(L) in the Eqs. (14), (15), (16) and (17), and 
reordering the equations, we get the following system: 
                          (18)
                   (19)
                         (20)
                     (21)
First, we must estimate (µ, σ2 and ρ) with the coffee 
price and banking rate series. Then, the estimated 
variables are replaced in Eq. (8) to get α and β. Next, 
all variables are substituted in Eqs. (18), (19), (20) 
and (21). Therefore, we can obtain A, B, H and L for 
numerical solution.
Dixit (1989) estimates H and L prices in the following 
formulas: 
        and       (22)
where W
H 
≡ C + ρK and W
L 
≡ C - ρL. With these 
variables and equations, we define the H and L prices 
3 If A ≠ 0 and P → 0 inV0(P), there would be a value of the option to enter, that situation is not logical, because firms do not have incentive to enter with 
P→ 0. So, the constant A must be equal to 0.
4 If B ≠ 0 and P → ∞ in V1(P), there would be a value of the abandonment option, that situation is not logical, because with a p → ∞ a firm never has 
incentive to take exit decision. So, the constant B must equal be to 0. 
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for Arabica and Robusta coffee for the period 2002-
2012, and therefore growers’ entry or exit decision in 
this volatile and uncertain sector.
Data
Ecuadorian coffee prices
The Ecuadorian Arabica and Robusta coffee annual 
prices (USD/lb) for the period 1990-2012 were obtained 
from the (ICO) International Coffee Organization, 
denominated in nominal terms. Future coffee prices are 
negotiated in the New York and London markets. Thus, 
world coffee prices are exogenous variables that affect 
the Ecuadorian prices directly. 
We supposed that the coffee price follows a random 
walk behavior as:
                                 Pt = λPt-1 + ut                          (23)
where Pt-1 is the price of the previous year, and ut  is 
the error term that follows a random walk with value 
0 and constant variance. To determinate if Ecuadorian 
coffee prices follow a random walk behavior, it is 
necessary to perform the Unit Root Test (λ=1). We used 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to validate the unit 
root with three possible models for each series: without 
constant, with constant as well as with constant and 
trend, where ∆Pt = Pt - Pt-1 and δ= λ-1.
∆Pt = δPt-1 + α∆Pt-1 + ut
∆Pt = β1 +  δPt-1 + α∆Pt-1 + ut
∆Pt = β1 + β2 t + δPt-1 + α∆Pt-1 + ut
This test was performed for Arabica and Robusta 
price series. In each model, we incorporated lagged 
terms to analyze, with most accurately, the existence 
of the unit root. For Arabica series results, none of 
the models rejects the null hypothesis at a confidence 
level of 95%. However, for Robusta series results, two 
of three models cannot reject the null hypothesis at 
confidence level of 95%5. Thus, with these values, we 
supposed that Ecuadorian Arabica and Robusta coffee 
prices follow a random walk behavior. 
Now, we get the returns (θ = ln(Pt/Pt-1))  for Arabica 
and Robusta price series for the period (2002–2012), 
and so, we get µ and  for each year, whereby, these 
values are used to estimate H and L prices.
Cost of capital 
This information is obtained from the (BCE) 
Central Bank of Ecuador (2002-2012). In Ecuador, 
the financial system is divided into segments. The 
banking interest rate varies according to the segments. 
However, agricultural growers do not have access to the 
conventional Ecuadorian banking system because many 
of them do not have any collateral. For this reason, it 
is the public bank that provides loans to agricultural 
growers. For banking data, we select the interest rate 
that banks used for the period January 2002-June 2007. 
Since mid-2007, a new regulation of the financial 
system created segments according to the amount of 
credit money that the clients applied for. Therefore, we 
select the PYMES (small and medium firms) segment, 
which is for clients requiring a loan equal to or less than 
USD 200,000 for the period August 2007-December 
2012. This segment corresponds to the amount of 
money that growers required for the investment in the 
coffee activity.  
Table 2. Establishment and maintenance cost (in USD/ha) for Arabica and Robusta coffee 
Activities
Robusta coffee Arabica coffee
First year Second year From the third year First year Second year From the third year
Land preparation 348 0 0 672 0 0
Sowing 760 0 0 1,390 0 0
Fertilization 455 377 412 640 335 304
Cultural labor 357 441 407 357 465 410
Insect control 26 38 53 26 38 53
Disease control 26 38 53 26 38 53
Harvest 72 96 766 72 96 846
Annual cost 2,044 990 1,691 3,183 972 1,666
Source: MAGAP (2014)
5 The results data and test execution are available from the author upon request
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Coffee costs
Coffee is a perennial tree that is productive for up 
to 20 years. According to the information published 
by the Ecuadorian Ministry of Agriculture (MAGAP), 
and shown in the Table 2, Robusta coffee costs 3,034 
USD/ha (first and second years) in 2013. This cost does 
not consider depreciation and assumes that the grower 
owns the land; additionally, the irrigation system is not 
considered in this cost. Rainfall, rivers or tanks near the 
farms provide water for the coffee hectares. In 2012, 
Ecuador had 108,064 ha of coffee trees that did not 
have irrigation systems (INEC, 2012); this represents 
95.51% of coffee hectares in the country.
Now, we can estimate Arabica and Robusta 
costs (USD/lb). Table 2 shows establishment and 
maintenance costs per hectare for Robusta and Arabica 
coffee (all the cost items are expressed in 2013 prices). 
The Ecuadorian Ministry of Agriculture (MAGAP) 
only made public the cost structure for Robusta variety6. 
This cost structure shows the quantity of labor and 
agrochemical products required to cultivate one hectare 
of Robusta coffee in Ecuador. For Arabica coffee, we 
performed an adjustment of the quantity of inputs (labor 
and agrochemicals) and costs in Table 2 to obtain the 
most accurate estimated cost for this variety.
For Robusta coffee, sowing is the largest cost item 
for the first year (USD 760). Fertilizer and cultural 
labor represent 82.58% of the total cost for the second 
year. During our analysis period (2002-2012), the 
values were adjusted to the inflation rate (agrochemical 
products, seeds, etc.) and labor wage for each year. 
During 2012, the cost of establishing a coffee hectare 
was USD 2,783.15. We could estimate cost K to be 5.49 
USD/lb in 2012, this value is calculated by dividing 
establishment cost per hectare by the average coffee 
yield (MAGAP data).
To estimate the variable cost per unit (C), we 
considered as a reference the activities of the third year 
that the MAGAP has estimated to a value of 1,691 
USD/ha for 2013. Harvest was the highest cost in 
that year (USD 766) due to the wages paid. With the 
variable cost adjusted to the data and average yield for 
each year, we could estimate variable C for the whole 
analyzed period. It is important to note that coffee 
beans are sold without any transformation process. 
The model assumes an infinite life project (renewal of 
the trees and fixed assets). In our case, growers do not 
have any irrigation system, which means that they do 
not to require fixed assets. For 2012, we estimated C 
cost as 3.65 USD/lb; this cost includes variable cost and 
the cost for growers to renew the trees every 20 years 
(infinite project assumption).
We tried to estimate the abandonment cost per lb (X), 
but we did not find any official information (costs of tree-
cutting and land-clearing). Therefore, we considered an 
estimated cost of 16 units of labor per hectare (MAGAP 
defines that 16 units of labor are required to clear the 
land before planting Robusta coffee; we will consider 
that the same amount of labor is necessary to clear the 
land of coffee trees and switch to another crop). For the 
2002-2012 period, we considered MAGAP and the basic 
Ecuadorian wage to estimate X value for each year. For 
2012, the daily wage for land preparation activities in 
the agricultural sector was USD 10-12.70 depending on 
the province (MAGAP, 2014). We considered a value of 
USD 10 for this year. Then, we estimated the X cost as 
160 USD/ha and 0.32 USD/lb. 
Also, Table 2 shows the cost for an Arabica coffee 
hectare in 2013. Establishment costs reach USD 4,155 
(first and second year) and variable cost USD 1,666. 
To estimate K, C and X Arabica cost, we adjusted the 
values to inflation rates, labor wages and tree renewal 
costs for each year for the analyzed period.
For 2012, we obtained K (7.64 USD/lb), C (3.85 USD/
lb) and L (0.32 USD/lb) costs. It was possible to verify 
that only the K cost had significant difference between 
both varieties. This results from the investment made in 
the first year: sowing, land preparation and fertilization 
activities demand more resources for Arabica coffee, 
the main reason being that more trees have to be planted 
per hectare.
Results
We estimated H and L prices for Arabica and Robusta 
coffee. Fig. 1a shows entry (H) and exit (L) Arabica prices 
and paid prices to the grower7 on the left-hand side and 
the evolution of coffee harvest hectares on the right-hand 
side for the analyzed period 2002-2012. The price to enter 
the coffee activity, H, was between 6.40 and 17.57 USD/
lb. Since 2004, the H prices followed a downward trend. 
However, these values would not provide an incentive to 
enter the coffee activity (H prices were above paid prices 
to Ecuadorian Growers), nor did they provide incentive 
for current growers to renew coffee trees.
The L price defines the exit decision for the activity. By 
comparing L prices with paid prices to Ecuadorian growers, 
we observed that L prices are above paid prices in most 
years (except in 2011). Thus, an average coffee grower 
would be inclined to exit the sector in most of analyzed 
6 The MAGAP published the cost farm structure in: http://sinagap.agricultura.gob.ec/insumos-cafe
7 Paid price data is adjusted to coffee cherry prices according to the COFENAC information.
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years. This is consistent with the decreasing number of 
hectares in the coffee harvest. The decreasing trend started 
in 2004, despite increasing coffee prices. In Ecuador, the 
costs agrochemicals products and wages have increased 
continuously. Variable cost (C) has also experienced an 
increased tendency, lifting the L price upwards.  
Fig. 1b shows the Robusta coffee situation. Entry 
prices (H) present values between 6.58 and 17.63 USD/
lb during the entire analyzed period. With these prices, 
we can determine that there were insufficient incentives 
to enter (new growers) or renew coffee hectares (current 
growers) due to the low prices paid for Robusta coffee 
in Ecuador during the 2002-2012 period. 
The paid prices received by Robusta growers did not 
cover C costs in any year. Thus, the coffee activity does 
not generate profits and coffee growers would incur 
economic losses if they continued in the activity. We 
observe that L line was above paid price in all analyzed 
periods, indicating that coffee prices were too low for 
current growers. This supports the conclusion that 
average Ecuadorian coffee growers would take the exit 
decision every year since 2002.
Our findings indicate that, for both coffee varieties, 
volatile and uncertain prices as well as increasing costs, 
forced growers to exit the sector. More specifically, 
variable  representing the expected rate of market 
growth exhibited negative values for Robusta in 2002 
and for Arabica in 2002-2003. Since 2004,  has positive 
values caused by the high upward trend experienced in 
the world and Ecuadorian coffee market. This upward 
movement would be attractive to new (enter) and current 
(renewal of hectares) growers; nonetheless it did not 
have the expected effect in the Ecuadorian coffee market. 
This is explained by the increasing labor costs, which 
Figure 1. Coffee area harvest, entry (H) and exit (L) Arabica (a) and Robusta (b) prices and paid prices to growers
a)
b)
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cause K and C values to increase, in turn triggering high 
values of H and L prices; the average yield would be 
measured as an indirect force that pushes K and C costs 
up. The average coffee yield for Ecuadorian growers 
is considered low (0.1- 0.3 t/ha) if it is compared with 
some of the major principal coffee-producing countries. 
However, even if the average coffee yield improves 
in the next years, this would not guarantee that K and 
C would decrease to the necessary extent due to the 
increasing wage costs in previous years.
Sensitivity analysis  
For each coffee variety, we performed a sensitivity 
analysis to evaluate how changes on the variables 
influence the entry (H) and exit (L) prices. We used @
Risk software to perform the sensitivity analysis for year 
20128. First, we determined the distribution for each 
variable according to the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC). Next, we defined the entry and exit variables 
of the model to perform the sensitivity simulations for 
each coffee variety. With H and L simulation results, we 
chose the two most important variables for each coffee 
variety according to the output of the Tornado diagram. 
Fig. 2 displays the simulation results of the Arabica. 
For σ2 (the variance rate of price market), we simulated 
values between 5% and 35% and obtain H prices 
ranging from 6.72 to 13.05 USD/lb. If market volatility 
increases, H increases. For variable C, with a value 
between 0.05 and 5.00 USD/lb we obtained H prices of 
2.44 and 12.2 USD/lb. Therefore, if the grower faces a 
higher cost C each year, the H price would be higher. 
For L price, µ (expected rate of the market growth) 
and (capital cost) were the two most significant 
variables. We simulated variable µ values ranging 
from -50% to 10%, raising L between 3.33 USD/lb and 
0.70 USD/lb. Our results showed the inverse relation 
of µ and L, as expected; as high coffee prices would 
encourage growers to continue producing coffee instead 
of exiting the sector. With variable ρ values between 
7.5% and 30%, L prices varied between 0.09 and 1.82 
USD/lb. There was a direct relation between ρ and L: if 
decreases for coffee growers, L will also decrease. This 
has an obvious policy conclusion: if access to capital 
can be obtained at lower interest rates, growers might 
be stimulated to remain in the coffee sector.
Fig. 3 displays the price results for Robusta coffee.  σ2 
and C are the most important variables affecting H prices. 
In the sensitivity analysis, we modeled  values in a range 
of 5% ─ 35% to simulate the effect of volatility in H price 
(6.10 ─ 10.85 USD/lb). In our simulation, we could find a 
direct relation between σ2 and H: if σ2 increases for coffee 
activity, a high H price is obtained. Therefore, new coffee 
growers would not start up a plantation, and current 
growers would not replant the trees. Variable σ2 is more 
important for Robusta than for Arabica growers, based on 
8 We selected the last year (2012) for the sensitivity analysis due to its more complete historical information to determine the distribution for each variable 
of the model.
Figure 2. Sensitivity analysis for entry (H) and exit (L) Arabica prices (2012)
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the coffee simulation analyses. This suggests that Robusta 
coffee growers were exposed to more volatility and price 
uncertainty than Arabica coffee growers. For variable C, 
we simulated values ranging from 0.05 to 5.00 USD/lb 
and obtained H prices between 2.07 and 12.92.
We also characterized an inverse relation of µ and L: 
if µ increases in the coffee market, the L price adopts 
a low value. This market movement would encourage 
current coffee growers to remain in business, but 
increasing costs would compromise the crop profits. 
When variable ρ was simulated with values ranging 
from 7.5% to 30%, we obtained L prices between 0.11 
and 1.62 USD/lb. The direct relation of µ and L implies 
that any increase in µ forces L to increase as well.
Additionally, coffee growers were affected by increasing 
input costs, especially by the cost of labor for sowing, 
maintenance and harvesting activities. This reduces the 
profits and inflates L prices, encouraging growers to exit 
the coffee activity despite periods of high coffee prices.
Discussion
The results show that volatile and uncertain coffee 
prices may have been the major reason for growers 
to leave the sector during the period 2002-2012. Our 
sensitivity analysis highlights the importance of C 
(variable cost) in the definition of entry and exit coffee 
prices for both varieties. In year 2012, C had a value 
of 3.85 USD/lb for Arabica coffee and 3.65 USD/
lb for Robusta coffee. Luong & Tauer (2006) found 
that cost C of Vietnamese Robusta coffee was from 
0.15 to 0.27 USD/lb in the year 2002. In comparison, 
Ecuadorian Robusta coffee was much more expensive 
(4.87 USD/lb) during the same year. For Arabica 
coffee, Bravo et al. (2016) found a cost C of 1.51USD/
lb in a conventional system for Colombian growers 
in 2010. For the same year, the difference between 
Ecuadorian growers and Colombian growers was 1.98 
USD/lb. Our conclusion is that Ecuadorian coffee 
production faced efficiency challenges. One of these 
challenges was the low yield (0.23 t/ha. for 2012). 
Since the end of 2011, the Ecuadorian government 
has offered growers technical assistance and better-
quality seed. However, yearly increments in wages for 
farming activities increased as well harvest costs and 
reduced the expected profits. The future profits from 
an improved yield will be reduced in the long run as 
the wages increase each year.
Simulations carried out on the variable µ (expected 
rate of the market growth) show that an increase in the 
value of  causes a reduction in L prices for both coffee 
varieties. This would postpone the exit decision of 
current growers. At the same time, increasing K and C 
costs discourage current growers from staying in the 
activity due to the high production cost. The net effect of 
and increasing costs (K and C) is a slight reduction of L 
prices. Thus, the incentives to stay in the activity are low.
Figure 3. Sensitivity analysis for entry (H) and exit (L) Robusta prices (2012)
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Low σ2 values reduced entry coffee prices, which 
would be attractive for new growers if C and K costs 
were not high. The net effect was a slight reduction of H 
price that did not encourage investment in new hectares 
or renewal of existing hectares. Price stabilization and 
risk-management mechanisms have been proposed to 
reduce the volatile and uncertain nature of the sector, 
but its successful application depends on transparency, 
fairness and intermediaries in the process (Mohan, 
2007; Malan, 2013). 
An option to improve the growers’ household income 
is turning into organic growing and shading the coffee 
plantations. These coffee production systems would 
fetch better prices than the conventional system, but costs 
and premium prices would not guarantee high profits in 
the long run according to an evaluation in other coffee 
producing countries (Valkila, 2009; Ruben & Fort, 2012). 
These possible solutions require more studies in order to 
find out whether they can succeed in the long run.
The increasing farming costs forced all inefficient 
growers to leave the sector, a hypothesis that is proved 
by the exit prices obtained in the model. H and L coffee 
prices would be signs of profitable activity despite the 
volatility and uncertainty of the sector. The Ecuadorian 
government implemented a program offering technical 
and financial support. This policy only improves the 
harvest in the short or medium term. The main problem 
remains in the volatile and uncertain prices and 
increasing cost of production in the long term, which 
coffee growers have to face each year. The government 
and coffee growers must work together towards efficient 
production: finding a way to have an attractive and 
profitable activity despite of volatility and uncertainty.
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